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This study examines a sample of European private equity transactions undertaken between 2000 
and 2015. The factors that have an impact on the likelihood of the target’s default are identified 
and evaluated through a logistic regression. Three groups of variables are included in the 
analysis: (1) economic variables which capture the trend of the overall economy; (2) deal 
features, defined as variables on which the PE has a decisional power; (3) specific 
characteristics of the target firm before the transaction. The findings suggest that leverage 
employed in the transaction, cross border deals, targets ROA previous to the transaction, and 
the fact of being a company from UK has an impact of the likelihood of default. 
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Este estudo analisa uma amostra de transações europeias de private equity (PE) realizadas entre 
2000 e 2015. Os fatores que influenciam a probabilidade de falência da empresa alvo são 
identificados e avaliados através de uma regressão logística. Três grupos de variáveis são 
incluídos na análise: (1) variáveis económicas, que captam a tendência da economia global; (2) 
características do negócio, definidas como variáveis sobre as quais o PE tem poder de decisão; 
(3) características específicas da empresa alvo antes da transação. Os resultados sugerem que a 
alavancagem empregada na transação, transações transnacionais, metas de rentabilidade ROA 
anterior à transação, e o facto de ser uma empresa do Reino Unido tem um impacto da 
probabilidade de falência. 
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Private equity firms, together with their LBO activity, have become increasingly important in 
the world’s financial markets, both as a financing alternative in the corporate lifecycle and as 
an asset class for investors1. Indeed, Private Equity is seen as a relatively recent asset class that 
has been particularly satisfying for investors in the last years since it has, on average, 
outperformed the stock market2. For the sake of clarity, even if the term private equity is 
generally used to encompass both buyouts and venture capital, this paper focuses on the buyout 
market and will refer to private equity transaction as a typical LBO 3.  
PE activity is known for recurring boom and boost periods that characterized its history since 
the first LBOs. The phenomenon emerged in the 1980s as a consequence of the venture capital 
activity, benefitting primarily from rising stock prices and the development of the junk bond 
market, and experienced a first decline in the 1990s4. After that, the activity started to rise again 
until a minor decline caused by the 2007 financial crisis. The difference was that this second 
boom (2001-2006) was driven mainly by the availability of syndicated bank debt in turn traded 
in the secondary market or packaged into structured products (CLO)5. Subsequently, from 2010, 
the sector has started to grow once again and we are now approaching a new boom cycle. 
Among the favorable factors contributing to this boom have been: an increase in investor’s 
interest in the sector, ebullient equity markets, low interest rates, abundant liquidity and steady 
GDP growth in US and Europe.  
PE firms always have more money available, as investors have allocated more capital to these 
firms over the past five years than in any time in history. To give an idea of the size of the 
funds, in 2018, a total of $582 billion was raised globally (+10% from 2017). At the same time, 
as shown in Figure 1, PE dry powder (defined as uncalled capital) has been rising since 2012 
across all fund types.  Figure 2 shows how deal values are steadily increasing as of 2014, while 
                                                          
1 Groh, A. P., Baule R. and Gottschalg O. 2008. “Measuring Idiosyncratic Risks in Leveraged Buyout 
Transactions.“ IESE Business School Working No. D682. 
2 PricewaterhouseCoopers Aktiengesellschaft Wirtschaftsprufungsgesellschaft (Pwc), “Private Equity Trend 
Report 2015, Upward momentum inspiring confidence”, 2015. 
3 Ernst, S. Koziol, C. and Schweizer, D. 2013. “Are private equity investors boon or bane for an economy? A 
theoretical analysis” European Financial Management, 19 (1), 180-207. 
4 Fenn, W. George, Liang N. and Prowse S. 2011. “The Private Equity Market: An Overview” Financial Markets, 
Institutions and Instruments 6 (4), 1-106.  
5 Acharya, V., Franks J. and Sarvaes H. 2007. “Private Equity: Boom and Bust?” Journal of Applied Corporate 




the number of LBO deals does not seem to increase at the same rhythm (-13% from 2017). This 
means that the average deal value is remarkably increasing due to the high amount of capital 
available, indeed the size of the average disclosed buyout has been climbing for six years and 
hit a record in 2018 with the $17 billion buyout of Thomson Reuters’ Financial & Risk unit, 
operated by Blackstone and the Canada Pension Plan investment fund6.  
Figure 1. Dry powder per PE activity between 2003 and 2018. 
 
                                    Source: Bain & Company, 2019. “Global Private Equity Report 2019”. 
Figure 2. Deal value and number of LBOs between 1996 and 2018. 
 
                                                            Source: Bain & Company, 2019. “Global Private Equity Report 2019”. 
Private equity activity can also be seen as a controversial topic of discussion, mainly because 
of the high levels of debt that characterize the acquisitions. Indeed, in a leveraged buyout a firm 
is acquired by a specialized investment firm using a small portion of equity and a relatively 
large portion of outside debt financing, thus meaning that the ownership is highly concentrated 
after the transaction and the PE firm owns a majority control. This characteristic of PE 
transactions ties the acquired company in strict debt obligations, lowering the cash flows 
                                                          




available for alternative investments. Critics argue that LBOs increase the probability of 
bankruptcy, as fixed schedule repayment resulting from leverage are likely to increase the 
likelihood of default. This could consequently lead to job losses and destruction of the value of 
corporations, impacting the overall economy negatively7. Moreover, PE firms aim to sell the 
target company after a certain period and are therefore accused of striving for high short-term 
returns at the cost of long-term firm’s prospects8.  
On the other side, supporters of PE activity claim that PE funds represent an opportunity for 
additional funding for firms and provide a new management model, which is superior to any 
other form of ownership9. Jensen (1989)10 was the first to affirm the superiority of the PE 
ownership model. Firstly, it aims to solve agency problems, as it is characterized by 
concentrated ownership, incentives to the management, and close monitoring of it11. Indeed, 
because of the majority interest owned by PE firms in the target company, they are highly 
motivated in pursuing the best performance and, more importantly, powerful enough to decide 
the direction the company should take12. Firm executives most of the time own an insignificant 
percentage of the outstanding equity in the firms they run, and this weakens their drive to create 
shareholder value13. On the contrary, one of the main strengths of PE activity is that managers 
are usually bestowed with significant shares, which represent an essential incentive to focus on 
the company’s performance14. Secondly, the high level of leverage forces managers to deal with 
operational problems earlier and more forcefully than they would have done in the absence of 
debt15. Finally, management turnaround after the acquisition is usually very high, and the new 
directors appointed by PE firms are aware of the mechanism of a private equity transaction, 
knowing how to best prepare the company for an advantageous selling16. Following these 
                                                          
7 Palepu, K. G., 1990. “Consequences of leveraged buyouts.” Journal of Financial Economics 27 (1), 247-262. 
8 Ernst, S. Koziol, C. and Schweizer, D. 2013. “Are private equity investors boon or bane for an economy? A 
theoretical analysis” European Financial Management, 19 (1), 180-207. 
9 Ernst, S. Koziol, C. and Schweizer, D. 2013. 
10 Jensen, M. C. 1989. “The eclipse of the public corporation” Harvard Business Review, 89, 61-74. 
11 Murphy, K. J. 2012. “Executive Compensation: Where We Are and how We Got There” in George M. C. 
Milton H. and Stulz R. Handbook of Economics of Finance, vol. 2, 211, 233-35. 
12 Cheffins, B. R. and Armour, J. 2007. “The Eclipse of Private Equity”, Dalware Journal of Corporate Law, 33 (1). 
13 M Murphy, K. J. 2012. 
14 Cheffins, B. R. and Armour, J. 2007. 
15 Jensen, M. C. 1989. 
16 Ronald W. M. and Randall S. T. 2009. “Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The Effects of Private Equity and 




theories, several studies support the notion that leveraged transactions create value, showing 
significant gains in operating performance after the deal17. 
Even if it is not clear how long this positive atmosphere can last until the next downturn 
materializes, it is evident that PE activity plays an important role in almost all developed capital 
market. For this reason, since the 1980s, there has been considerable research on the topic. The 
results observable in the literature are often conflicting, and this can be partially attributed to 
the quality of data. Indeed, the research conducted on private equity usually focuses on specific 
geographic markets or segments (especially PTPs or MBOs) due to the scarcity of data and 
limited samples to conduct proper research18. In most instances, data for private firms are not 
fully and easily accessible, which is why many studies examine transactions that involve public 
debt, companies that subsequently went public or LBO of public companies. For this reason, 
more frequently than not, the results obtained are potentially biased and not generalizable to a 
broader population of PE transactions. For example, firms with public debt financing are 
usually bigger and the sample would, therefore, be characterized by larger companies.   
Most of the research on this topic, focuses on PE funds drivers’ returns or investigate the post-
investment impact on the target company, highlighting the effects of PE management to find 
out if this particular type of ownership creates value improving firm’s performance19. Fewer 
papers address the issue of PE-backed companies’ default and those which did, mainly focused 
on public companies. Indeed, research into corporate failure, more broadly not only considering 
PE-backed companies, has focused mainly on listed companies due to data availability20.  
This research provides insights into the most relevant criteria that PE firms should take into 
account when investing in a company to reduce the likelihood of default. The purpose of this 
paper is to investigate which factors have an impact on the probability of default of the target 
company focusing on Europe, highlighting that the research was initially intended to be more 
extensive including the US market. However, it was not possible to gather enough accounting 
                                                          
17 Shourun, G. Hotchkiss E. S. and Weihong  S. 2011. “Do Buyouts (Still) Create Value?”, The Journal of Finance, 
66 (2), 479-517.  
18 Puche, B. Braun R. and Achleitner A. 2015. “International evidence on value creation in private equity 
transactions”, Journal of Applied Finance, 27 (4), 105-122. 
19 Burth, B. and Solveig R. 2019. “Private equity deal success and pre-acquisition determinants – empirical 
evidence from Germany”, Applied Economics, 51 (2), 141-154. 
20 Wilson, N. and Wright M. 2013. “Private Equity, Buyouts and Insolvency Risk”, Journal of business Finance and 




data for the target companies in that region in order to obtain reasonable regression results, and 
hence, the US sample has not been considered in the end.  
As suggested by Palepu (1990)21, there are three main reasons why a buyout could fail. Firstly, 
the structure of the buyout could be flawed; for example, the leverage is not sustainable 
compared with post-buyout cash flows or a too high premium was paid. Secondly, post-buyout 
management could be weak. Third, the general economic condition could have a decisive 
impact. As data related to the management of such a large sample is not easily collected, the 
second category has been substituted with pre-acquisition target characteristics22, linked either 
to the business activity or to its history. Summarizing, the analysis takes into account a sample 
of 7318 private equity acquisitions undertaken in Europe between 2000 and 2015, considering 
three dimensions of factors that influence default: (1) economic variables which capture the 
trend of the overall economy; (2) deal factors, defined as variables on which the PE has a 
decisional impact; (3) specific characteristics of the target firm before the transaction. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, a review of literature regarding the PE 
deals outcome is presented and this is used to create the research hypothesis. Successively, the 
sample collection is described, and the variables used are defined. In section IV results are 
shown and the relative impact of each factor on default is discussed. Section V concludes and 
suggestions for further research are presented.  
This research provides insight on where to invest in the European landscape, analyzing a 
potential relation between the success or failure of a deal and a set of defined factors. Based on 
the analyzed criteria, the aim is to draw a conclusion on whether PE decision making can be 
optimized taking into account the significant factors.  
 
                                                          
21 Palepu, K. G., 1990. 
22 These factors have recently been investigated by Burth and Solveig for a sample of acquisitions carried out in 
Germany. Reference: Burth, B. and Solveig R. 2019. “Private equity deal success and pre-acquisition determinants 







2 Literature review 
The percentage of deals in which the target company defaults, is usually found to be very low 
despite the differences in sample and period analyzed. Andrade and Kaplan (1998)23 identify 
that 29% of the larger public-to-private transactions of the 1980s defaulted at some point. 
Kaplan and Stein (1993)24 analyzed the collapse of the LBO market in the late 1980s, arguing 
that 26 of the 83 large LBOs completed between 1985 and 1989 defaulted and 18 entered 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. Lopez-De-Silanes et al. (2010)25 reported from a sample 
of 7453 LBOs that 12.9% of PE deals went bankrupt between 1971 and 2005 worldwide. On 
average, it was found to have lower default rate from studying the second wave of LBOs. 
Thomas (2010)26 analyzing a sample of 3269 private equity transactions occurred in US 
between 2000 and 2009, finds that between 2008 and 2009, 183 targets defaulted. It can be 
translated to a 5.6% cumulative default rate (2.84% annually), which is lower than the overall 
speculative-grade default (6.17% per year for the same period found by Moody’s). Similarly, 
Kaplan and Stromberg (2009)27, analyzing a sample of 17171 private equity acquisitions carried 
out worldwide between 1970 and 2007, found that only 6% ended in bankruptcy (on average 
1.2% annually), underlying that the bankruptcy incidence was lower than the Moody’s average 
default rate for the same period (1.6% annually28). Achleitner, Braun and Engel (2011)29 
analyzing a sample of 1090 deals undertaken in Europe between 1986 and 2010, found that 99 
of the transactions did not generate any positive cash flow for the PE firm or went bankrupt, 
which represent 9.1% of the sample.  
An element that is claimed to greatly impact the PE industry is the credit market condition. 
Both in the 80’ and mid’00 booms, the credit market experienced an explosion in liquidity 
which led to an unprecedented supply of leverage throughout the global financial system and, 
                                                          
23 Andrade, G. and Kaplan S. N. 1998. “How costly is financial (not economic distress)? Evidenced from Highly 
Leveraged Transactions that became distressed”, Journal of Finance, 53 (5), 1443-1494.  
24 Kaplan, S. N. and  Stein. 1993. “The evolution of buyout pricing and Financial Structure in the 1980s”, Quarterly 
Journal of EconomicsI, 108 (2), 313-357.  
25 Lopez-De-Silanes, F. Phalippou L. and Gottschalg O. 2015. “Giants at the Gate: Investment Returns and 
Diseconomies of Scale in Private Equity“, Journal of Financial and Quantitative AnalysisI, 50 (3), 377-411.  
26 Thomas, M. J. 2010. “The Credit Performance of Private Equity-Backed Companies in the Great Recession of 
2008-2009”, Private Equity Council. 
27 Kaplan, S. N. and Stromberg P. 2009. “Leveraged Buyout and Private Equity”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
23 (1), 121-248. 
28 Default rate of bond issuers between 1980 to 2002 by Moody’s.  
29 Achleitner, A. Braun R. and Engel N. 2011. “Value creation and pricing in buyouts: Empirical evidence from 




in particular, to a growth of investments in private equity and hedge funds30. Kaplan and 
Stromberg (2009) argue that private equity investments are related to economic conditions, 
affirming that investors seem to take advantage of market timing when the cost of debt is 
particularly low. They also observe that in specific periods of the boom-and-bust cycle, when 
the debt is particularly cheap, private equity firms overpay their targets, and this seems to be 
one of the reasons that lead to losses. Alexston et al. (2013)31 confirm this hypothesis finding 
that leverage is associated to higher transaction prices and lower funds final returns, advocating 
that PE firms overpay their targets in periods of easy access to credit, due to easy access to debt. 
Consistent with this finding, Guo, Hotchkiss and Song (2010)32 analyze a sample of 192 public 
to private transactions undertaken between 1990 and 2006, of which 23 defaulted (12%), 
finding that these deals generated an only a modest increase in firm operating performance still 
generating high returns. They consider the impact of transaction pricing on the deal outcome, 
providing evidence that private equity firms benefit from acquiring targets at a lower price than 
other bidders, therefore buying at a particularly low price and selling high. Similar results were 
obtained by Acharya and Kehoe (2007)33, Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz and Zutter (2007)34 
and Wright et al. (1995)35. Linked with these finding, Achleitner, Braun and Engel (2011)36, 
analyze buyouts carried out between 1986 and 2010 in Europe and North America and argue 
that besides leverage and operational improvements, the EBITDA multiple expansion (defined 
as the difference between the entry and exit price) is particularly important to determine PE 
returns. This finding would suggest that the price paid at entrance has an important role in the 
deal outcome, advocating that the lower the premium paid at entrance the lower the probability 
of default.  
An interesting point of discussion is whether the level of leverage influences the probability of 
bankruptcy. Kaplan and Stain (1993)37 argue that the high incidence of default registered in the 
1980s leveraged buyout is due to the excessive amount of leverage undertaken by PE firms, 
which increased to 90% of the total capital, together with an increase in the price paid in the 
                                                          
30 Morgan Stanley, 2006. “Morgan Stanley Roundtable on Private Equity and Its Import for Public Companies“,  
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 18 (3), 8-37. 
31 Alexston et al, 2013 
32 Shourun, G. Hotchkiss E. S. and Weihong  S. 2011.  
33 Acharya, V., Franks J. and Sarvaes H. 2007. 
34 Bargeron, L. Schlingemann F. P. Stulz S. and Zutter C. 2007. “Why Do Private Acquirers Pay So Little Compared 
to Public Acquirers?”, Fisher College of Business Working Paper 2007-03-011.  
35 Wright, M.Thomson S Robbie K. and Pauline W. 1995. “Management Buy-Outs in the short and long term”, 
Journal of Business Finance Accounting, 22 (4), 461-482. 
36 Achleitner, A. Braun R. and Engel N. 2011. 




transactions. Alexstone, Jenkinson, Stromberg and Weisbach (2012)38 analyze a sample of 153 
buyouts carried out by top PE firms between 1980 and 2006 in Europe and US, including mainly 
public to private transactions. For the period 2004-2007 they find very high leverage of about 
73%, similar to the 77% that characterized the 1980s LBO boom which subsequently collapsed, 
therefore suggesting that the level of leverage plays a role in the default probability. Findings 
in line with this hypothesis are also shown by Hotchkiss et al. (2011)39 for US and Wilson and 
Wright (2013)40 analyzing a sample of UK acquisitions. 
On the contrary, Thomas (2010)41 found that a large number of the defaulted companies had 
little or no leverage indicating that leverage did not play a role in the probability of default. 
Instead, stating that default seems correlated with the financial health of the target company 
at the time of the acquisition, as most of the defaulted companies were acquired by previous 
bankruptcies. Moreover, the default seems to be correlated to the overall economic activity, as 
companies belonging to sectors affected by a downturn in the period were overrepresented.  
An important issue is that the premium paid at entrance and the level of leverage seem to be 
correlated. Indeed, Axelston et al. (2012)42 provide empirical evidence of a negative correlation 
between deal leverage and interest rates, showing that the leverage used in the deal is unrelated 
to firm and industry characteristics whilst appearing to be driven by economic credit condition. 
The conclusions suggest that deals tend to be priced higher if cheap debt is available, as more 
leverage is used in the transaction. The correlation between deal pricing and leverage is also 
found by Ilg (2015)43 and Achleitner, Braun and Engel (2011)44, who spot a positive correlation 
between leverage and buyout pricing. In line with this finding, Alexstone, Jenkinson, Stromberg 
and Weisbach (2008)45, regressing the level of leverage to firm-specific characteristics, 
aggregate market conditions and the characteristic of the buyout fund, find that the main 
determinant of leverage is the real interest cost of the loans (measured as the local real interest 
rate plus the spread for leveraged debt).  
                                                          
38 Axelson, U. Jenkinson T.  Strömberg, P. and Weisbach, M. S. 2012. “Borrow cheap, buy high? The determinants 
of leverage and pricing in buyouts“, Discussion paper, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London School of 
Economics and Political Science, London. 
39 Hotchkiss, E. D. Smith D. C, and Stromberg P. 2011. “Private Equity and the Resolution of Financial Distress“, 
paper presented at the Coller Private Equity Institute Conference, London Business School.  
40 Wilson, N. and Wright M. 2013. 
41 Thomas, M. J. 2010. 
42 Axelson, U. Jenkinson T.  Strömberg, P. and Weisbach, M. S. 2012. 
43 Ilg, D. 2015. “Value creation drivers in large leveraged buyouts”.  
44 Achleitner, A. Braun R. and Engel N. 2011. 




Hypothesis 1. Hence, from what the literature establishes, the following hypothesis can be 
outlined: the higher the leverage used in a transaction the higher the probability of default.  
Several studies support the idea that private activity returns are linked to economic conditions. 
Alexson et al. (2012)46 argue that when the economy is particularly prosperous, there is 
evidence of greater private equity fundraising, higher deals value and more leverage. However, 
it is not clear if the economic trend has an impact in terms of deal returns and default probability. 
It could be expected that economic downturns could increase the probability of default as the 
target company’s performance could be impacted negatively. In line with this view, Kaplan and 
Stein (2007)47 find that in the 1980s LBO collapse, as a reaction to the economic crisis, banks 
accelerated their principal repayments resulting in an unsustainable schedule for many firms. 
On the opposite, Guo, Hotchkiss and Song (2010)48 find evidence that year dummies, either 
for the year of the buyout or the exit, do not help in explaining the performance, suggesting that 
the deal outcome does not depend on the overall economic trend. An explanation for the fact 
that downturns do not play a role is given by the findings of Bernstein et al. (2017)49. They 
analyze a sample of PE backed companies in UK and find that PE-backed firms invest more 
aggressively than peer companies during downturns. This ability to maintain a high level of 
investment appears related to the superior access of PE-baked companies to financing, and the 
lower cost of debt (measured as interest expenses over total debt compared with a control 
sample of non PE-backed companies). In line with these findings, Ivashina and Kovner (2011)50 
found that PE groups represent a valuable source of funding during downturns, due to the strong 
bonds with the banking industry which allow them to access credit for their firms during periods 
of crisis. Moreover, PE firms raise money to their funds which is then invested over multiple 
years, leaving them with high undrawn capital. It turns out to be particularly useful in periods 
in which the accessibility to credit, for example to refinance a distressed company, is more 
complicated. For these reasons, it seems that PE-backed companies are not affected by 
economic downturns as their peers.  
Hypothesis 2. Due to the high leverage employed by PE firms, it is fundamental that the target 
firm is generating the forecasted cash flow after the acquisition, in order to pay back the debt 
                                                          
46 Axelson, U. Jenkinson T.  Strömberg, P. and Weisbach, M. S. 2012. 
47 Kaplan, S. N. and  Stein. 1993. 
48 Shourun, G. Hotchkiss E. S. and Weihong  S. 2011. 
49 Bernstein, S. Lerner J and Mezzanotti F. 2017. “Private equity and financial fragility during the crisis”, NBER 
Working Paper No. w23626. 
50 Ivashina, V and Kovner, A. 2011. “The Private Equity Advantage: Leveraged Buyout Firms and Relationship 




on a fixed schedule. It is expected that if the country experiences a contraction in the GDP, the 
firm’s revenue could be impacted negatively leading to fewer cash flows available and 
increasing the probability of insolvency. 
Smith and Stromberg (2014)51 focus on the characteristics of the PE acquirer. They argue that 
the likelihood of default is lower when the LBO acquisition is relatively recent in the lifetime 
of the particular fund, due to the ability to provide capital support thanks to undrawn 
commitments. In addition, the likelihood of default decreases when the PE firm has been more 
successful, measured by the ability to raise new funds.  
Hypothesis 3. Following what highlighted in the literature, it is expected that companies backed 
by more successful PE firms are less likely to default.  
Limited research has been conducted on the potential relationship between pre-buyout target 
characteristics and the probability of default. Berthold and Solveig (2019)52 confront this issue 
analyzing the deal outcome (measured via the equity multiple) of 125 transactions that took 
place in Germany. They argue that pre-buyout revenue has a negative influence on the outcome 
of the transaction, as targets with lower revenue are more likely to outperform than bigger 
targets. A positive influence has also been found for one of the seven industries (healthcare), 
meaning that operating in a specific industry can be advantageous. Contrasting to this, pre-
buyout EBITDA, industry and firm’s age does not seem to be good predictors of the success of 
PE transactions in Germany.   
They do not investigate specific pre-acquisition profitability ratios, however, Wilson et al. 
(2013)53, analyzing a sample of UK buyouts between 1995 and 2010, argue that PE firms tend 
to choose companies with higher profitability (ROA) and cash generation, expecting that they 
will continue to be particularly profitable after the acquisition.  
Hypothesis 4. In line with previous studies, it is expected that the age of the target does not 
influence the probability of default. 
Hypothesis 5. In accordance with the literature, companies which are more profitable before 
the acquisition, measured by ROA, are less likely to experience default. 
                                                          
51 Hotchkiss, E. D. Smith D. C, and Stromberg P. 2011.  
52 Burth, B. and Solveig R. 2019. 




An additional factor to consider is whether the target company is characterized by a particular 
condition at the moment of the acquisition. Special circumstances are a secondary buyout, 
defined as a deal in which both acquirer and seller are financial sponsors54 and a distressed 
acquisition. There is much skepticism about SBOs in the research community. Bonini (2010)55 
claims that in SBOs the operating performance is not improved as much as in first buyouts. 
Cumming and MacIntosh (2003)56 argue that the increase in SBO activity coincided with 
greater liquidity and higher deal price and leverage than first buyouts. This would suggest that 
in SBO the returns are mainly due to the leverage effect than an actual operational improvement. 
Prequin (2011)57 prompts that in periods of high undrawn capital, PE firms have higher pressure 
to invest and they may end up not acting in the best interest of investors, carrying out SBOs 
despite being aware of limited possible operational improvement.  An opposite view is given 
by Achleitner and Figge (2012)58, who study a sample of 2456 European buyouts between 1990 
and 2010 and find no evidence that secondary buyouts generate lower returns for the PE fund.  
Hypothesis 6. Considering the finding of previous studies, which claim lower operational 
improvement and higher leverage in secondary buyouts, the following hypothesis is stated: 
SBOs are more likely to default than primary buyouts. 
The second particular condition discussed is the case of the target company being financially 
distressed before the acquisition. Sudarsanam et al. (2011)59 studying a sample of P2P UK 
transactions, argue that, even if distressed companies could represent a significant turnaround 
opportunity, the high bankruptcy risk at the time of acquisition increases the changes that the 
target will end up in default later. A similar thesis is supported by Opler and Titman (1993) 60 
who claim that an high bankruptcy risk when associated with the typical high leverage used in 
PE deals, may increase the chances of default.  
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60 Opler, T. and Titman, S. 1993. “The determinants of leveraged buyout activity: Free cash flow vs. financial 




Hypothesis 7. In line with the presented literature, it is predicted that acquisitions of distressed 
companies are more likely to end up in default.  
Scellato et al. (2013)61 investigate 241 private to private buyouts involving European companies 
and find out that target companies backed by PE firms in the same country exhibit higher post-
buyout performance. They argue that this is due to a comparative advantage in dealing with 
asymmetric information and agency problems, and in offering privileged access to expert 
advice.  
Hypothesis 8. Following the mentioned findings, companies backed by PE firms in the same 
nation are expected to be less likely to default.  
The UK has always been the largest LBO player in Europe62 and, back in 2007, it showed the 
biggest PE market as percentage of country GDP. Moreover, it is the first European country in 
terms of deals number63.  
Hypothesis 9. As the PE market is more developed in UK, it is expected that PE firms in this 
region are more experienced and knowledgeable of how to manage the acquired firms. Hence, 
targets operating in the UK are expected to be less likely to default. 
Table 1 presents a summary of the discussed hypothesis.  
Table 1. Summary of the hypothesis. 
 Definition 
Hypothesis 1 The higher the leverage used in a transaction the higher the probability of default. 
Hypothesis 2 A decrease in the target’s country GDP increases the probability of default. 
Hypothesis 3 Companies backed by more successful PE firms are less likely to default. 
Hypothesis 4 The age of the target does not influence the probability of default. 
Hypothesis 5 Companies which are more profitable before the acquisition are less likely to default. 
Hypothesis 6 SBOs are more likely to default than primary buyouts. 
Hypothesis 7 Acquisitions of distressed companies are more likely to end up in default. 
Hypothesis 8 Companies backed by PE firms in the same nation are less likely to default. 
Hypothesis 9 Targets operating in the UK are less likely to default. 
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3 Data Sample and Variables 
 
3.1 Sample Selection 
 
The data collection for this paper requires a two-steps approach: (1) deal data collection and (2) 
target characteristics collection. The first part focuses on gathering data about the PE deals that 
took place in Europe between 2000 and 2015; collected data includes information on the deal’s 
features (i.e. value, date), on the target firm and the acquiring PE firm. The initial sample is 
drawn by data held by Zephyr, owned by Bureau Van Dijk, the most comprehensive database 
regarding deal information. In particular, it contains a specific sub-database with detailed 
information regarding private equity deals. The initial screening identifies 10972 transactions 
that took place between 2000 and 2015 in Europe, classified as “institutional buyout”, for which 
the deal is defined as “completed - confirmed”64 and report as transaction financing the caption 
“private equity”65 and as sub-deal type “leveraged buyout”66. Thereafter, only deals in which 
the BvD ID number of the target company were present are kept in the sample. This is a code 
which identifies the companies in an unequivocal way among all Bureau Van Dijk databases, 
and it is later needed to match the target companies in Amadeus. Moreover, only acquisitions 
of a majority interest (between 50% plus one and 100% stakes) are considered, excluding the 
cases in which the acquirer was already owning more than 50%67.  
The second part focuses on collecting data about the target company with a matching procedure 
in Amadeus from Bureau Van Dijk. Through this database, it is possible to obtain the status of 
the company, which is fundamental to differentiate between the companies that defaulted and 
the ones that did not. Moreover, it provides accounting data needed to investigate whether 
specific characteristics of the target firm before the acquisition play a role in the target’s default 
probability and to calculate specific post-deal ratios. The matching procedure highlights that 
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about 70% of the codes are found in Amadeus. As some companies appear two times in the 
sample (being SBOs), in the end a final sample of 7318 deals was analyzed.  
However, the fact of being present in the database does not imply that all data for the variables 
needed is actually provided; indeed, many missing observations are present. Moreover, 
Amadeus provides the ten most recent years for the same company starting from a certain “last 
year available” and going backwards. This last year is sometimes previous to the acquisition 
date and many times the reason for not updating the company’s data is unclear. For this reason, 
when including accounting information in the model, the considered sample ends up being 
significantly smaller.  
 
3.2 Dependent variable: the Default variable 
 
An important matter is to differentiate between the companies that defaulted and the ones that 
did not. In order to discriminate between the two categories, three main methods have been 
utilized. Hence, several regression models are developed, one for each defined dependent 
variable.  
Amadeus Status, dependent variable (1) is defined 
The first measure relies on the “Status” reported in Amadeus for the target company.  A list of 
“statuses” is disclosed for every company together with the relative dates, yet it is fundamental 
to determine whether the default occurred while the company was still under the PE firm 
control. In other words, it is important to control for the fact that the deal has not been already 
exited at the time of default, as in this case the influence of a subsequent owner could have had 
an impact. To solve this issue, the BvD ID code of each target company was matched with a 
list of acquisitions provided by Zephyr and carried out between 2000 and 2019, highlighting if 
the company was involved in any subsequent deal and to determine its date. As not all M&A 
deals are present in the database, for the target companies identified as defaulted a further 
control is carried out looking for online news mentioning that they were involved in subsequent 
deals. For the purpose of this paper, a company it is considered as “defaulted” if it missed a 
payment or filed for bankruptcy, as this is the definition of default for a credit default swap 
contract, according to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). Therefore, 




“Bankruptcy”, “Defaulted (Bankruptcy)”, “Active: insolvency proceedings”, “Active (rescue 
plan)” and “Active: default of payment”.  On the contrary, companies reporting “Active” are 
considered as still alive. Table 2 in Appendix reports detailed description of each Status 
variable. 
This procedure identifies the defaulted companies with high certainty, but few shortfalls are 
still present. Firstly, for some firms the status is “Unknown” or not reported, hence they are 
excluded from the analysis, decreasing the sample size. Secondly, it is possible that firms 
classified as active actually defaulted, both if the status has not been updated anymore or due 
to errors in the database. For this reason, two other methods to discriminate between the two 
categories are employed. 
Assets analysis, dependent variable (2) is defined 
To partially remedy the first shortfall, the approach of Bernstain, Lerner and Mezzanotti 
(2019)68 is applied. It is based on observing whether assets are not reported any more in the 
database, while they were reported in the year of the acquisition. In this case, a firm is 
considered “out of business” and these observations are added to the list of defaulted companies 
found with the first method. Similarly, companies that still report assets are considered as active 
(26 defaulted and 21 active companies could be added to the sample with this method). 
However, the interpretation of this variable is unclear as the company can disappear from the 
database for many reasons, such as an acquisition, a liquidation, a merger or a bankruptcy.  
Ratio Approach, dependent variables (3) (4) (5) and (6) are defined 
To deal with both the first and second shortfall described, a third method is implemented. The 
use of financial ratios to predict bankruptcy was pioneered by Beaver (1966)69 and Altman 
(1968)70. ROA (defined as net income over total assets) is chosen as discriminant ratio, being 
found the second-best ratio to predict bankruptcy according to Beaver 71. A decision had to be 
taken regarding the ratio cut-off point and the year to observe the ROA. It is important to choose 
a number of years after the transaction in which it is fairly sure that the deal has not been exited 
yet and, at the same time, enough time is left to the target company to actually default. In this 
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Journal of Finance, 23 (4),589-609. 
71 Beaver (1966) individuates cash flows over total debt as best ratio to predict bankruptcy, however not enough 




paper, the ratios are calculated three and five years after the acquisition as the average holding 
period is found to be between 4.5 and 5.8 years72. Even if five years is probably a better time 
period, three years is taken into account as more observations are present. Indeed, as only ten 
years of data are kept in Amadeus, considering a subsequent year decreases the number of 
observations available. Following the mentioned paper, the cut-off points are set both at 0.02 
and 0.00. Concluding, variables (3) and (4) are based on the ROA three years after the 
transaction with cut-off points of 0.02 and 0.00 respectively. Variables (5) and (6) are defined 
observing the ROA five years after the transaction with a cut-off point of 0.02 and 0.00 
respectively. Table 3 presents an overview of the discussed dependent variables. 
Table 3. Description of the dependent variables. 
 Definition 
Dependent variable (1) Based on the “status” reported in Amadeus. 
Dependent variable (2) Adding to the defaulted firms found in Dependent variable (1), the firms of which the 
assets disappeared from the database. 
Dependent variable (3) Based on ROA 3 years after the acquisition with cutoff point 0.02. 
Dependent variable (4) Based on ROA 3 years after the acquisition with cutoff point 0.00. 
Dependent variable (5) Based on ROA 5 years after the acquisition with cutoff point 0.02. 
Dependent variable (6) Based on ROA 5 years after the acquisition with cutoff point 0.00. 
 
3.2 Explanatory variables 
 
Leverage 
This variable is measured by the ratio of debt to capital73 in the year of the acquisition. Outliers 
are winsorized at the 99th and 1st percentile to obtain more robust results. 
Top 5 
This variable is a binary variable which points out whether the transaction is carried out by a 
particularly active PE firm. The five PE firms are individuated relying on the number of 
transactions carried out within the sample, as this is assumed to be an indicator of a firm’s size. 
They are Blackstone, the Carlyle Group, Sun Capital Partners, 3 I Group and Riverside.  
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A variable that is expected to capture the experience of the PE firm is the dummy variable 
“Cross Border”, denoting when the PE firm and the target do not belong to the same country. 
Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that smaller PE firms focus their investments in their own 
region due to a better knowledge of the market, while bigger firms take on more risk investing 
abroad, maybe cooperating with smaller local PE firms. 
GDP growth 
This variable accounts for the economic conditions of the target country. It is calculated by the 
GDP growth mean of the three years following the acquisition, in the target country. Data was 
obtained from OECD statistics database. 
Deal Type 
This is a categorical variable that distinguishes among distressed acquisitions, secondary 
buyouts and the rest of the transactions. Secondary buyouts are identified according to the “deal 
rationale” description reported in Amadeus, which indicates whether the deal is an exit from a 
previous PE owner. Moreover, all deals in which the target company is appearing for the second 
time in the sample were added. Likewise, distressed firms are identified through the “deal 
rationale” reported in Amadeus, whenever a distressed acquisition caption is reported. In 
addition, when all needed accounting data relative to the year before the transaction are 
available, the z-score for non-manufacturing companies (Altman, 200074) is used to define 
whether the acquired company was in financial distress before the acquisition.  
The z-score is defined as: 
𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =  6.72 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑇𝐴










with Equity being market value of equity; WC working capital; RE retained earnings; TL total 
liabilities and TA total assets. As some data to calculate the ratios is missing, “shareholder 
funds” are used instead of retained earnings and book value of equity is employed instead of 
the market value (the same approximations are used by Tykvová and Borell, calculating the z-
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score using Amadeus database75). According to the model, companies that score more than 2.9 
are considered healthy, companies with a lower score than 1.23 are in high financial distress 
and the ones with a score in-between stand in a grey area. In this paper, only companies with a 
score lower than 1.23 are categorized as in financial distress.   
ROA 
The variable “ROA” is defined as net income over total assets in the last full year prior to the 
buyout. Outliers are winsorized at the 99th and 1st percentile. 
Common Law  
This is a binary variable which takes into account whether the target company operates in a 
common law country (UK) or not.  
Target age 
This variable captures the age of the target company and is calculated as the difference between 
the incorporation year, reported in Amadeus, and the deal year reported in Zephyr. The variable 
is transformed into natural logarithms to avoid spurious results76.  
 
3.3 Instrumental variables 
 
Revenue and EBIT 
These variables are observed in the year before the transaction. Outliers are winsorized at the 
99th and 1st percentile.  
ROE 
This variable is calculated as net income over equity in the year previous to the acquisition. 
Outliers are winsorized at the 99th and 1st percentile. 
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This is a dummy variable which indicates whether the PE firm was already owning a minor 
stake in the target company before the acquisition. The information is taken by the “deal 
description” reported in Amadeus which indicates whether the acquisition is 100% and the 
previously owned stake.  
Crisis 
This is a dummy variable that controls whether the financial crisis has an impact on the 
probability of default. It identifies the acquisitions carried out between 2006 and 2009.  
TA 
This variable is an approximation of the target’s size and refers to the total assets one year 
previous to the acquisition. Outliers are winsorized at the 99th and 1st percentile. 
Leverage -1 
This variable is calculated as debt over capital in the year previous to the acquisition. Outliers 
are winzorised at the 99th and 1st percentile. 
Long term interest rates  
The variable “LT” aims to capture the importance of the cost of debt at the time of the 
transaction. Long term interest rates were collected in relation to the target company for the 
year in which the acquisition took place.  
Premium  
This variable is employed as a measure of deal pricing. The premium paid over the target is 
calculated as the percentage difference between the price paid for the firm (deal value), as 
reported in Zephyr, and the total book value of the target company in the year before the 
transaction, calculated as the sum of total liabilities and equity77. Outliers are winsorized at the 
99th and 1st percentile. 
 
                                                          





In order to control whether targets operating in specific industries behave differently, industry 
dummies were added into the regression. The industry for every target company is defined 
starting from the four-digit SIC code reported in Amadeus for each company. The industries 
considered are construction, finance, manufacturing, mining, retailing, services, transports, 
wholesale, public administration, and agriculture. 
Table 4 (in Appendix) reports a detailed description of each variable and the sources.  
 
3.4 Summary statistics  
 
Table 5 reports summary statistics for all the variables included in the regressions. The 
discrepancy in the number of observations is due to data availability. Indeed, the variables 
reflecting accounting data include considerably fewer observations than the others. 
Moreover, a deal outcome could be determined only for a partial number of deals, ranging 
between 4793 in model II and 1092 in Models V and VI. Thus, six different subsamples are 
analyzed, one for each model.  
Average leverage is 65%, which is lower than the 90% found for the 1980s deals, and the 70% 
for the second LBOs wave of 70%78, but still high enough to greatly impact the default risk of 
the target firms. In addition, it is quite stable throughout the sample (66% for 2000-2009 
buyouts and 64% for 2010-2015 buyouts).  
The variable Age, indicates that an ample variety of companies is included in the sample. The 
age range between 0 and 157 shows that some firms are sold within the first year of inception. 
The mean of 20 years suggests that the majority are relatively older firms than start-ups. The 
same is underlined by the revenue which ranges between 1 and $2.4 Million. 
The low average ROA of 3.8% can be explained by the fact that PE firms usually target 
companies that have margins for operational improvements as one of the main focus points of 
                                                          




PE activity is the efficiency improvement throughout the holding period. The average ROA 5 
years after the transaction is, in fact, found to be 18%.  
Cross border acquisitions account for 39% of the full sample, while 23% of the sample are 
acquisitions of UK companies.   
Looking at the control variables, the mean premium is 10% which is relatively low. Remarkable 
is that without winsorizing the variable, the average premium is 121% showing that few bigger 
deals are present in the sample.  
 
Figure 3 presents the number of deals in regard to the year, while Table 6 (in Appendix) shows 
the number of deals by country. Even if the database is not complete and fails to report many 
deals, it is still found to reflect the real situation as the United Kingdom is the country which 






Mean St dev Min Max Nr. 0 Nr. 1 
Dependent variable (1) Binary 4791 - - - - 4653 138 
Dependent variable (2) Binary 4793 - - - - 4629 164 
Dependent variable (3) Binary 1699 - - - - 902 797 
Dependent variable (4) Binary 1699 - - - - 1138 561 
Dependent variable (5) Binary 1092 - - - - 620 472 
Dependent variable (6) Binary 1092 - - - - 736 356 
Leverage Continuous 1824 0,647 0,399 0 2,772 - - 
Top5 Binary 7318 - - - - 7144 174 
Cross border Continuous 7318 - - - - 4472 2846 
GDP Continuous 6756 1,823 1,739 -7,297 11,752 - - 
Distressed Binary 7318 - - - - 6949 369 
SBOs Binary 7318 - - - - 5231 2087 
ROA Continuous 4179 0,038 0,201 -0,827 0,558 - - 
Common law Binary 7318 - - - - 5633 1685 
Age Continuous 4430 19,591 20,578 0 157   
Revenue Continuous 1072 93498,410 240976,500 1 2407510 - - 
EBIT Continuous 4214 4775,723 82258,32 -1757819 4470000   
Initial stake Binary 7318 - - - - 6881 437 
ROE Continuous 4173 0,169 1,476 -7,740 8,070   
Crisis Binary 7318 - - - - 4730 2588 
Leverage -1 Continuous  1587 0,630 0,335 0,000 1,96 - - 
TA Continuous 4716 
118049,50
0 
358527,800 2,859882 3662453 - - 
LTI Continuous 6602 3,644 1,427 -0,069 15,824 - - 




presents more observations, followed by France and Germany79. Moreover, looking at 
observations throughout the years it is easily identifiable the boom followed by the 2008 
financial crisis. 
 
Figure 3. Deals partition among years. 
 
                                                                       
The industry of the target could be determined in 2930 deals. Figure 4 shows the industry’s 
frequency in the various industries, pointing out that almost 65% of the targets involved in the 
transaction are from either the manufacturing or services sector.  
 
Figure 4. Targets partition among industries. 
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4 Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1 Methodology 
The aim of the paper is to individuate the main factors that influence the probability of a firm’s 
default after the acquisition from a PE firm. In particular, the objective is to differentiate among 
three categories of factors: pre-buyout determinants of the target company, economic factors 
and the ones that capture specific characteristics of the PE deal. The analysis uses cross-
sectional data with continuous and categorical predictors, while the dependent variable admits 
a binary outcome. In previous literature, logit and probit models are usually used to predict 
bankruptcy (Hauser and Booth, 201180; Ohlson ,198081; Burth  et al. 201982). For the purpose 
of this paper, a maximum likelihood logistic regression is employed, and the analysis of the 
odds is performed. Stata is employed to analyze the data.  
The proposed regression, including all explanatory variables, is the following:  
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 = ∝  + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑜𝑝5 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑎𝑤 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 +   𝛽5𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑔𝑒 
 
4.2   Results 
Table 7 presents six different models with the respective results. Each model includes one of 
the dependent variables previously defined. Multicollinearity among explanatory variables is 
tested through the variance inflation factor (VIF) reported in Table 8 in the Appendix, which 
shows how much the variance of the coefficient estimate is being inflated by multicollinearity, 
the correlation matrix between predictors and the condition indexes83. All the variables show 
VIF values of less than 2.5 which is considered to be the maximum acceptable to claim absence 
of multicollinearity in the model84. The correlation matrix (showed in Table 9 in Appendix) 
among predictors reports a correlation of 30% between the two deal categories “distressed” and 
“SBOs” and a correlation of 23% between leverage and the deal type “distressed”. However, 
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82 Burth, B. and Solveig R. 2019. 
83 The approach is taken by Habshah, M. et al. (2013). 





none of the correlation coefficients is higher than 0.8, which is considered the critical value to 
recognize multicollinearity85. Finally, the condition indexes (Table 10 in Appendix) are all 
lower than 1586. OLS regressions are employed as robustness tests, confirming that the direction 
and the significance of the variables are in line with the logistic regression ones (results for 
OLS are reported in Table 11 in Appendix). 
Table 7. Regressions results, using all explanatory variables. Logit regression 
results reported as odds ratios. 
 Dependent variable 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
























































































































Pseudo R² 0,121 0,136 0,091 0,066 0,076 0,073 
Observations 1462 1509 1316 1316 784 784 
notes:  
*Statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. 
***Statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. 
 
As expected, most of the deals have a positive outcome and the default rate is very low. 
Considering models I and II, which rely on larger samples, the default rate ranges between 
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2,88% and 3.42% for the analyzed period (on average 0.2% annually). This is lower than the 
global speculative-grade default rate, of 4.20% on average, between 2000 and 2015. Taking 
into account the crisis period only, the average default rate between 2007 and 2010 increases 
to 0.8% annually, which is still lower than the average default rate of 1.88% for the same 
period87. 
The first two models are believed to better capture the reality as the other four are possibly 
biased.  Firstly, if a PE firm exited the investment before the set periods of three and five years 
considered, there would be the influence of a subsequent owner. Secondly, the target could take 
longer periods to default, as sometimes the acquisitions are kept in the portfolio even for 10 
years. For example, Blackstone, one of the biggest PE firm in the world, acquired the famous 
Hilton Hotel chain in 2007 and sold it through an IPO in 2018 gaining $14 billion after 11 years. 
Hence, the default rates for the analyzed samples could be biased both downward and upward. 
For this reason, the models that rely on the ROA cut-off points are mainly utilized to confirm 
the findings of models I and II.  
The results of the statistical significance show that some of the independent variables are not 
statistically significant. Furthermore, some variables change the significance according to the 
model.  
 
4.2 Adding extra explanatory variables  
 
The introduction of more explanatory variables in the model is a recurring strategy used in 
literature to verify the robustness of the estimations. The aim is to control for other factors 
suspected to affect the dependent variable.  
In Table 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 (in Appendix) the models are tested adding several 
instrumental variables. Every table refers to one of the six different models showed in Table 5. 
Regression I reports the results obtained including only the explanatory variables. Control 
variables that reflect accounting data are included one by one due to the strong correlation 
among them. Regression II includes Revenue while regression III includes EBIT. Regression 
                                                          





IV substitutes ROA with ROE to test whether a different efficiency ratio has the same impact. 
Regression V includes the variable TA. In Regression VI the binary variables Crisis and Initial 
stake are included. In regression VII leverage level before the transaction is included while the 
deal type “Distressed” is excluded as they would capture the same information. Since the 
literature finds correlation among leverage, interest rates and premium paid for the target, these 
two variables were not included in the original models as to not influence the variable Leverage, 
and are added as control variables in regressions VIII and IX. Finally, regressions X and XI 
control for years and countries fixed effects.   
The continuous variable Leverage is highly statistically significant in five of the studied models. 
The odds ratios indicate that, holding all the other variables at a fixed value, for a unit increase 
in leverage the odds of default increase by between 57% and 117%. The results hold in all the 
models in which leverage is found significant, and also when adding most of the control 
variables. Exceptions are observed when including Revenue or industry fixed effect, but this 
can be explained by the considerable reduction in sample size in these two regressions. Hence, 
hypothesis 1 is confirmed. This means that the debt taken on for the purpose of the acquisition 
has a great impact on the probability of default and that PE firms are occasionally leveraging 
their targets with an unsustainable level of debt. At the same time, several studies88 argue that 
firms with greater increases in leverage have, in the end, higher cash flows, operating gains and 
hence better returns. This means that the amount of debt should be carefully chosen, as it 
increases returns up to a certain level, while it could lead to the target’s default beyond that 
point.  
A relation between interest rates, leverage and premium paid is pointed out by many studies. 
Therefore, when adding the variable LTI in regression VIII, it was expected that lower interest 
rates would increase the probability of default, being drivers of higher leverage and hence 
higher default probability. However, the results suggest a different conclusion. Interests rates 
are found to be significant only when including them in the first model (Table 12, regression 
VIII): for one unit increase in interest rates, the odds of default increase by 18%. Since interest 
rates are observed in the acquisition year, they are a proxy of the cost of debt employed in the 
acquisition. Hence, this finding suggests that the higher the interests paid on the debt the higher 
the probability of default. However, in the other five models the interest rates are not significant, 
and this could also be caused by a possible correlation between this variable and leverage. 
                                                          




Similarly, when including the premium (Regression IX), it is found to be significant only in 
Model I and II. At the same time, the variables LTI and Leverage lose their significance. This 
difference can be explained by the fact that the three variables are very likely to be correlated 
and that the regression relies on one fourth of the observations than the other models (as the 
premium could be only calculated for deals reporting the deal price). Hence, conclusions for 
the actual impact of interest rates and the premium paid cannot be determined with certainty.  
The analysis shows that the variable Top5 is not statistically significant in the models, hence 
hypothesis 3 is rejected. In Model I and II, in Regressions II, IX and XI the variable had to be 
omitted due to perfect collinearity with the dependent variable. This means that target 
companies backed by the five most active PE firms in the sample never defaulted. Still, it is 
important to consider that the sample is considerably reduced in these regressions and this is 
likely to be the reason that drives the perfect collinearity: for example, in regression II (Model 
I) only 20 deals out of 985 are backed by top firms and none of these is found to default. A 
weakness of this variable is also that many deals carried out by big PE firms are made in 
cooperation with other sponsors, creating SPVs with different names. As the variable is 
constructed on the names reported in the database, it is likely that it does not capture all the 
deals backed by the top 5 PE firms.  
The variable Cross Flag is significant in two of the models, showing, on the contrary to 
hypothesis 8, that firms backed by PE from a different country are less likely to default (in the 
other four models the direction of the odds ratio is the opposite, however it is not statistically 
significant). The significance found in Model I and II holds when including the control 
variables. The negative impact on the default probability can be due to the fact that only the 
most active and experienced PE firms undertake deals in other countries. Moreover, they 
probably employee the best experts in the sector and are able to cooperate with smaller local 
sponsors, which can provide closer insights to the specific market.  
The variable GDP while being significant at 0.10 in the second model, it is not in the other 
models. In addition, the OLS for the second model does not confirm the significance and, when 
including control variables, it loses its significance (Table 13). Hence, the results suggest that 
hypothesis 2 is rejected as GDP does not influence the default probability. A possible 
explanation is that the performance improvement implemented after the acquisition (broadly 
confirmed in the literature) more than counterbalances the possible losses in revenue due to 




available to pay back the debt are not negatively impacted by downturns and the probability of 
default is unvaried.  
The test shows that, among the two deal types defined, only secondary buyouts seem to have 
an impact on the deal outcome. The variable SBO is significant in four models, showing that in 
secondary buyouts the likelihood of default decreases by 60% on average. Hence, hypothesis 6 
is rejected. On the other hand, secondary buyouts are found to default less than primary buyouts. 
The odds ratios are slightly different in magnitude throughout the models, but as they are all 
lower than zero it is possible to claim the positive impact of acquiring the target from another 
financial sponsor. A possible explanation is that firms that have already been under PE 
ownership for a certain number of years, are better organized and managed, hence performing 
better than targets of primary buyouts. 
An interesting finding is that companies which are in financial distress when acquired, do not 
seem to default more than healthy companies. The significance of the variable DIS in Model 
III can be explained by the fact that three years are not enough to exit a situation of financial 
distress and the group of companies that report ROA below the cut off points still include some 
of the companies acquired in financial distress. Indeed, when looking at models which observe 
the ROA after 5 years, the deal type “distressed” is not significant. To confirm the results the 
control variable leverage before the transaction is included in regression the Regression VII and 
it does not seem to influence the deal outcome in any of the models.  
The results show that the ROA one year prior to the transaction is significant in all the models. 
The odds ratios suggest that one unit increase in ROA decreases the odds of default by 13% on 
average, hence hypothesis 5 is verified. This suggests that firms that are more profitable when 
acquired, start with an advantage and are probably easier to be operationally improved. When 
ROE is substituted to ROA in Regressions IV, it is significant only in Model 3 and 4. Therefore, 
ROA seem to be a better predictor of the probability of default.  
The variable common law accounts for targets which operate in the UK, as this is the only state 
in the European region characterized by this kind of law. The results found for this factor are 
mixed and controversial. Indeed, despite being significant in five out of six models, the 
direction of the odds ratios is different showing a positive impact on default in the first two 
regressions and negative impact in the other three models. The results generally hold also when 
adding control variables. Following the approach of relying more on the first two models, they 




possible explanation is that the market is particularly developed in the UK, and more generally 
in common law countries, as the PE activity was born in these regions. As the market is more 
developed, there is more money invested in the sector from investors. This could lead PE firms 
to have less choice among possible investments and to more pressure to invest. As a result, PE 
firms could end up pursuing risky investments due to the usual fee structure of private equity 
funds. Typically, the PE firms receive an initial fee regardless of future returns, while the second 
source of income is the carried interests. These ones are distributed only after a minimum return, 
together with the initial investment, has been returned to the investors (hurdle rate). Moreover, 
PE firms can borrow money with the only aim to pay dividends, and due to the close link with 
the banking industry, are likely to obtain credit more easily.  
For instance, Phones 4U is one of the target company present in the sample which defaulted. It 
was the second-biggest mobile phone retailer in UK in the 2000s. In 2008 it was acquired by 
the private equity firm BC Partners, and ended up bankrupt in 2014. However, few months 
before the default the company borrowed £200 million to pay BC a special dividend, generating 
a 30% return on the initial investment in the target. According to the Financial Times this move 
left the company with debt four times the EBIT and this led soon to the default of the firm.  
Summarizing, PE firms in the UK could be less risk adverse than their European collogues due 
to the high amount of capital available and the higher difficulty in finding “right” targets, due 
to competition. Moreover, due to the more developed PE market they could have a closer bond 
with the banking industry and being able to obtain refinancing, even when the target company 
is in financial distress.  
Finally, in line with hypothesis 4, the results suggest that the age of the target does not have 
any impact on the deal outcome as the variable is not significant in any of the models. This 
means that acquiring a startup or a more mature company does not increase the probability of 
default. To carry out an additional control, the variable age was categorized in three groups: 
small companies with age lower than 3 (637 observations), medium companies with age 
between 3 and 9 (1034 observations), and mature companies with age higher than 9 (2759 
observations). This division points out that in the full initial sample mature companies were 
acquired more than four times higher than startups. As expected, substituting this categorical 
variable with the continuous variable age in the regression, the results do not change and none 
of the category is significant. An explanation for this finding is that PE firms focus their 




are particularly knowledgeable of both the sector and the market. Indeed, there are PE firms 
specialized in various stages of the corporate cycle (i.e. seed stage, growth capital, turnaround) 
hence are best able to manage these particular kinds of company.  
Generally, including the control variables in the models does not change the main findings 
highlighted for the explanatory variables. Small differences across the regressions in 
significance are likely to be explained by the variation in sample size.  
Furthermore, revenue, EBIT and total assets before the acquisition seem not to influence the 
default probability. The dummy variable that captures the crisis period is significant in Model 
I and II while the variable Initial Stake is significant in Models III and IV. However, as the 
results are not consistent, it is not possible to claim whether these variables have an impact on 
the default probability with certainty. 
Finally, in regressions XI some industries are actually dropped from the model as they predict 
failure or success perfectly, due to the few observations available in some groups. Hence, it is 
not a reliable analysis because the samples are greatly reduced in size. 
Table 18 presents a summary of the hypothesis initially stated in this paper and the main 
findings.  
Table 18. Summary of hypothesis and findings.  
 Definition Finding 
Hypothesis 1 The higher the leverage used in a transaction the higher the probability of default. Confirmed 
Hypothesis 2 A decrease in the target’s country GDP increases the probability of default. Rejected  
Hypothesis 3 Companies backed by more successful PE firms are less likely to default. Rejected 
Hypothesis 4 The age of the target does not influence the probability of default. Confirmed 
Hypothesis 5 Companies which are more profitable before the acquisition are less likely to default. Confirmed 
Hypothesis 6 SBOs are more likely to default than primary buyouts. Rejected 
Hypothesis 7 Acquisitions of distressed companies are more likely to end up in default. Rejected 
Hypothesis 8 Companies backed by PE firms in the same nation are less likely to default. Rejected 








This paper examines whether, and how, several factors influenced the default of the targets in 
leveraged buyouts between 2000 and 2015. While earlier literature focuses mainly on fund 
returns analysis and on specific countries or types of deals (MBOs, PTP), this research tries to 
analyze a broader sample which includes several countries and types of deals. 
A sample of 7318 deals was analyzed, but a defined outcome could only be found for a 
maximum of 4791 (Model II has the higher amount) transactions. Deal leverage, cross border 
deals, pre-acquisition target ROA, and being from UK or a secondary buyout acquisition seem 
the variables that mostly impact the likelihood of default. Being a UK target and having high 
levels of leverage result in an increase of this probability, while the other factors have an 
opposite influence. On the contrary, the age and the healthiness of the target before the 
acquisition and the post-buyout GDP do not seem to play a role. 
This paper takes into account several factors to determine what influences the default. However, 
the only factor that captures specific characteristics after the transaction is the variable GDP, 
which aims to reflect the economic trend after the deal. In the literature, returns are widely 
found to be driven by changes that the PE management is performing following the investment: 
mainly improvements in the operating performance (improving profitability, eliminating 
unproductive assets, usage of assets more effectively, asset purchases or sales). For this reason, 
it would be interesting to study whether adding these after-deal factors (i.e. management 
ownership or participation, change in management, subsidiaries selling, capital injections) 
change the results observed in this paper. A shortfall is represented by the fact that this analysis 
would need a close cooperation with PE funds, which again could bias the quality of data.  
Furthermore, variables related to the PE firms would also be important to study (i.e. age, size, 
undrawn capital in the transaction year). They were not included in this study because for many 
deals a SPV is reported instead of the real PE firm, therefore a matching procedure of the BvD 
codes in Amadeus would miss many observations.  
Characteristics of the target market are also likely to influence the deal outcome and it would 
be interesting to create a matching sample of non-PE-backed firms to obtain industry adjusted 
results. In this paper when including the industry variable, the sample size is greatly reduced, 




Finally, this paper focuses on deals in Europe and a comparative study for US would be 
interesting to control whether results are consistent. Indeed, a similar study to the one presented 
in this paper was attempted for the US, using Orbis which is the equivalent of Amadeus for US 
companies, but without success due to the lack of accounting data reported in Orbis for the 







Table 2. Description of Status captions as reported in Amadeus.  




Active The company is active. 
Active (rescue plan) 
The company remains active; it is not involved in insolvency 
proceedings, but is in a period of protection. One of the conditions 
is that the company hasn’t been incurred into default of payment 
(this means that there aren’t credits unpaid). The target is to 
prevent financial difficulties which endanger survival of the 
company. 
Active (reorganization) 
We make a distinction between plain active and active but being 
reorganized. A priori reason for reorganization is not having 
financial problems. 
Active (default of 
payment) 
The term “default” should be distinguished from the terms 
“insolvency” and “bankruptcy”. "Default" essentially means a 






Here the company is declared insolvent. The company remains 
active, though is in administration or receivership or under a 
scheme of arrangement (US - Chapter 11). During this period, the 
company is usually placed under the protection of a law and 
continues operating and repaying creditors and tries to reorganize 
and return to normal operating. At the end, the company will either 
return to normal operating, will be reorganized or will be 
liquidated. 
Bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy is a legally declared inability of a company to pays its 
creditors. The company is in the process of bankruptcy. The assets 
are being sold in order to repay the creditors. At the end the 
company will be dissolved and will no longer exist. 
Dissolved (bankruptcy) 
The company has been dissolved at the end of a bankruptcy 












The company no longer exists as a legal entity, but the reason for 
this is not specified. This means that the company is dead, has no 
more activity or is no longer included in the companies register. 
In liquidation 
All assets of the company are being sold and the next step will be 
that the company will be dissolved and will no longer exist. 
We reserve the term “in liquidation” mainly to friendly or 
voluntary liquidation. 
Dissolved (demerger) 
The company no longer exists as a legal entity and the reason for 
this is a demerger as the company has been "split". 
Dissolved (merger or 
take-over) 
The company no longer exists as a legal entity because the 
company has been included in a merger or was subject of a take-
over. 
Dissolved (liquidation) 
The company has been dissolved after (friendly) liquidation of its 
assets. 
Inactive (no precision) 
and Unknown 

















Table 4. Explanatory and control variables description. 
NAME Notation Type Definition Source 
Leverage  LEV Quantitative Total debt over capital in the year of the transaction. AMADEUS 
Top 5 TOP5 Categorical Dummy = 1 if PE firm is one of the five most active firm 
in the sample; 0 otherwise. ZEPHYR 
Cross flag CF Categorical Dummy =1 if target and PE firm are from different 
countries; 0 otherwise. ZEPHYR 
GDP GDP Quantitative 
Average GDP growth rate in the target country for the 
three years after the transaction. OECD 
Distressed acquisition DISS Categorical 
Dummy =1 if company in financial when acquired; 0 
otherwise. ZEPHYR, AMADEUS 
Secondary buyout SBO Categorical Dummy =1 if secondary buyout; 0 otherwise. ZEPHYR 
ROA ROA Quantitative 
Net income over total assets in the year before the 
transaction. AMADEUS 
Common law CL Categorical Dummy =1 if the target is from UK ;0 otherwise. ZEPHYR 
Log Age AGE Quantitative 
Age of the target since establishment. Number of years 
calculated backwards from the entry year. 
AMADEUS AND 
ZEPHYR 
Revenue REV Quantitative Revenue of the firm in the year before the transaction. AMADEUS 
EBIT EBIT Quantitative EBIT of the firm in the year before the transaction. AMADEUS 
ROE ROE Quantitative Net income over equity in the year before the transaction. AMADEUS 
Total assets TA Quantitative Total assets in the year before the transaction. AMADEUS 
Crisis Period CRIS Categorical 
Dummy =1 if the transaction took place between 2006 
and 2009. ZEPHYR 
Initial stake IS Categorical 
Dummy variable = 1 if PE firm was owing a percentage 
in n-1; 0 otherwise. ZEPHYR 
Leverage -1 LEV-1 Quantitative  Total debt over capital in the year before the transaction. AMADEUS 
Long term interest rates LTI Quantitative 
Long term interest rate in the target country in the 
transaction’s year.  OECD 
Premium PRM Quantitative 
Percentage difference between price paid in the deal the 
sum of total debt and equity the year before the 
transaction. 
ZEPHYR, AMADEUS 
Year YEAR Categorical Year of the deal. ZEPHYR 




























Table 6. Partition of deals among 
countries. 

























































Table 8. Variance inflation factor for 
explanatory variables. 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Leverage  1.14 0.8795 
Top 5 1.03 0.9683 
Cross flag 1.04 0.9595 
GDP 1.07 0.9385 
Distressed acquisition 1.23 0.8151 
Secondary buyout 1.13 0.8869 
ROA 1.16 0.8607 
Common law 1.06 0.9432 
Log Age 1.03 0.9742 
Mean VIF 1.10  
Table 9. Correlation matrix among predictors. 









Leverage  1.0000         
Top 5 0.0155 1.0000        
Cross flag -0.0441 -0.1275 1.0000       
GDP 0.0728 0.0050 -0.1042 1.0000      
Distressed 
acquisition 
-0.1748 -0.0180 -0.0518 0.0209 1.0000     
Secondary 
buyout 
-0.0312 -0.1109 -0.0568 0.0240 0.2930 1.0000    
ROA 0.2370 0.0158 0.0198 0.0363 0.1935 -0.0133 1.0000   
Common law -0.0062 -0.0223 -0.0623 -0.2134 -0.0048 -0.0789 -0.0485 1.000  
Log Age 0.0129 0.0023 0.0419 -0.0491 0.0579 0.0022 -0.1018 0.0054 1.0000 











Table 11. OLS results, using all explanatory variables.  
 Dependent variable 



































































































































R² 0,041 0,049 0,117 0,080 0,081 0,089 
Observations 1462 1509 1316 1316 784 784 
notes: 
*Statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. 
***Statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. 
 
Table 10. Conditional indexes 
for explanatory variables 




Leverage  1.00 
GDP 1.87 
ROA 3.00 
Common law 4.61 




Table 12. Regressions results with dependent variable (1), adding control variables. Logit 
regression results reported as odds ratios. 
  Model 














































































































































































































- - - - - - - - - 
EBIT - - 
1,000 
(0,01) 
- - - - - - - - 
ROE - - - 
0,955 
(0,09) 
- - - - - - - 
TA - - - - 
1,00 
(2,97) 
- - -  - - 
CRI - - - - - 
3,065** 
(1,42) 
- - - - - 
IS - - - - - 
1,391 
(0,71) 
- - - - - 
LEV-1       
0,546 
(0,29) 
- - - - 












No No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Industry 
dummies 


























0,111 0,102 0,117 0,089 0,122 0,133 0,114 0,124 0,158 0,168 0,280 
Nr Obs 1462 985 1425 1461 1462 1462 1394 1426 535 1423 470 
notes:  
(a) variable omitted due to perfect collinearity 
*Statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. 






Table 13. Regressions results with dependent variable (2), adding control variables. Logit 
regression results reported as odds ratios. 
  Model 













































































































































































































- - - - - - - - - 
EBIT - - 
0,999* 
(1,96) 
- - - - - - - - 
ROE - - - 
0,9554 
(0,08) 
- - - - - - - 
TA - - - - 
1,00 
(2,88) 
- - -  - - 
CRI - - - - - 
2,709** 
(1,18) 
- - - - - 
IS - - - - - 
1,917 
(0,86) 
- - - - - 
LEV-1 - - - - - - 
0,487 
(0,26) 
- - - - 












No No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Industry 
dummies 


























0,135 0,095 0,129 0,109 0,137 0,133 0,127 0,135 0,190 0,168 0,285 
Nr Obs 1509 1024 1494 1508 1509 1462 1440 1472 556 1443 489 
notes:  
(a) variable omitted due to perfect collinearity 
*Statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. 







Table 14. Regressions results with dependent variable (3), adding control variables. Logit 
regression results reported as odds ratios. 
  Model 
















































































































































































































- - - - - - - - - 
EBIT - - 
0,999* 
(1,53) 
- - - - - - - - 
ROE - - - 
0,858*** 
(0,39) 
- - - - - - - 
TA - - - - 
1,00 
(1,82) 
- - -  - - 
CRI - - - - - 
1,014 
(0,27) 
- - - - - 
IS - - - - - 
1,666** 
(0,38) 
- - - - - 
LEV-1 - - - - - - 
1,010 
(0,04) 
- - - - 












No No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Industry 
dummies 



























0,099 0,092 0,066 0,097 0,094 0,086 0,094 0,125 0,096 0,111 
Nr Obs 1316 907 1309 1316 1316 1316 1253 1282 499 1315 459 
notes:  
(a) variable omitted due to perfect collinearity 
*Statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. 





Table 15. Regressions results with dependent variable (4), adding control variables. Logit 
regression results reported as odds ratios. 
  Model 
















































































































































































































- - - - - - - - - 
EBIT - - 
0,999* 
(1,13) 
- - - - - - - - 
ROE - - - 
0,836*** 
(0,04) 
- - - - - - - 
TA - - - - 
1,00*** 
(1,62) 
- - -  - - 
CRI - - - - - 
1,284 
(0,35) 
- - - - - 
IS - - - - - 
1,782*** 
(0,41) 
- - - - - 
LEV-1 - - - - - - 
1,107 
(0,32) 
- - - - 












No No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Industry 
dummies 


























0,066 0,099 0,065 0,054 0,070 0,070 0,062 0,094 0,096 0,073 0,089 
Nr Obs 1316 907 1309 1316 1316 1316 1253 1282 499 1315 461 
notes:  
(a) variable omitted due to perfect collinearity 
*Statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. 










Table 16. Regressions results with dependent variable (5), adding control variables. Logit 
regression results reported as odds ratios. 
  Model 















































































































































































































- - - - - - - - - 
EBIT - - 
0,999* 
(2,69) 
- - - - - - - - 
ROE - - - 
0,958 
(0,05) 
- - - - - - - 
TA - - - - 
1,00 
(2,26) 
- - -  - - 
CRI - - - - - 
1,044 
(0,30) 
- - - - - 
IS - - - - - 
1,341 
(0,37) 
- - - - - 
LEV-1 - - - - - - 
1,597 
(0,60) 
- - - - 












No No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Industry 
dummies 


























0,076 0,071 0,074 0,059 0,072 0,072 0,074 0,072 0,0654 0,081 0,085 
Nr Obs 784 539 779 785 784 784 743 761 313 780 302 
notes:  
(a) variable omitted due to perfect collinearity 
*Statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. 





Table 17. Regressions results with dependent variable (6), adding control variables. Logit 
regression results reported as odds ratios. 
  Model 









































































































































































































REV -  - - - - - - - - - 
EBIT - - 
0,999* 
(4,38) 
- - - - - - - - 
ROE - - - 
0,974 
(0,05) 
- - - - - - - 
TA - - - - 
1,00 
(2,53) 
- - -  - - 
CRI - - - - - 
1,022 
(0,32) 
- - - - - 
IS - - - - - 
1,256 
(0,36) 
- - - - - 
LEVp - - - - - - 
2,044* 
(0,79) 
- - - - 












No No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Industry 
dummies 


























0,073 0,066 0,079 0,056 0,073 0,074 0,074 0,073 0,062 0,081 0,093 
Nr Obs 784 535 779 785 784 784 733 761 313 770 292 
notes:  
(a) variable omitted due to perfect collinearity 
*Statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. 
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